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Introduction 
In the Summer 1988 edition of the 
California Regulatory Law Reporter, 
Kenneth C. Crowley examined govern-
ment efforts to strengthen consumers' 
representation in public utility regulatory 
proceedings by requiring the inclusion 
of messages regarding consumer groups 
in utility billing statements. 1 That sub-
ject-and broader issues related to the 
government's ability to require someone 
to disseminate information intended to 
assist organizations opposed to that per-
son's interest-are particularly timely in 
light of the California voters' recent 
passage of Proposition 103.2 The Cali-
fornia initiative measure enacts a broad 
range of reforms to the state's insurance 
industry, including a requirement that 
automobile insurance companies enclose 
with their policy renewal statements a 
notice regarding the existence of an 
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organization that represents consumers' 
interests in insurance-related matters.3 
The history of Illinois' efforts to pro-
mote its legislatively created Citizens 
Utility Board (CUB)-initially, by author-
izing CUB to include messages in public 
utility billing statements, and later, by 
permitting CUB to distribute promotion-
al materials in mailings by state agencies-
offers important lessons to those in Cali-
fornia who support or oppose efforts to 
promote consumer organizations. As ex-
plained below, that history counsels 
against uncritical acceptance of Mr. 
Crowley's conclusion that CUBs can 
avoid the First Amendment issues in-
herent in forced disclosure schemes by 
arguing that they are merely acting as 
an arm of the government. Moreover, 
the Illinois experience offers an alterna-
tive means of effectively promoting con-
sumer organizations that does not 
impose forced disclosure requirements 
on the ideological opponents of those 
organizations. 
Limitations on the 
"Arm-of-Government" Argument 
Crowley's "primary recommendation" 
for achieving the goal of implementing 
"a comprehensive insert program which 
will best benefit consumers and with-
stand constitutional scrutiny" is to grant 
state-created CUBs access to utilities' 
billing envelopes. 4 Crowley's recom-
mendation is based on his belief that the 
strictures of Pacific Gas & Electric Co. 
v. Public Utilities Comm 'n, 5 a U.S. 
Supreme Court decision holding uncon-
stitutional a California Public Utilities 
Commission order granting a private 
consumer organization the right to in-
clude promotional materials in a utility's 
billing envelopes, do not apply to state-
created consumer groups.6 The discus-
sion below reveals that Crowley's 
argument overstates the importance, for 
purposes of constitutional analysis, of 
the public or private status of the organi-
zation whose messages are disseminated. 
The Constitutionality of Forced Dis-
semination of a Governmentally Pre-
scribed Message. Relying on language 
in PG&E recognizing that the state has 
"substantial leeway in determining appro-
priate information disclosure require-
ments for business corporations, " 7 
Crowley argues that enclosures in utility 
billing statements from a state-created 
consumer organization would constitute 
a permissible "legal notice.''8 However, 
as Crowley himself recognizes, this argu-
ment was rejected by the Seventh Circuit 
in Central Illinois Light Co. v. Citizens 
Utility Board.9 That lawsuit involved a 
challenge by Illinois public utilities to 
provisions in the Illinois Citizens Utility 
Board Act 10 that required the utilities, 
up to four times per year, to include 
with their billing statement messages 
from the Citizens Utility Board. 11 Unlike 
TURN, the private citizens' organization 
which benefited from access to a utility's 
billing envelopes in PG&E, the Illinois 
CUB is "a nonprofit public body corpor-
ate and politic. "12 The court of appeals 
nevertheless held that "[t]he statutory 
scheme created by [the CUB Act]. . .is, in 
all material respects, constitutionally 
indistinguishable from the CPUC order 
struck down by the Court in Pacific 
Gas."13 
While there are other grounds for 
disagreeing with the outcome of Central 
Illinois Light, 14 the district court in that 
case correctly held that "negative free 
speech" rights not to participate in the 
communication of messages with which 
one disagrees include the right not to 
promote objectionable messages from 
public, as well as private, entities. 15 
This principle is illustrated by the 
Supreme Court's 1943 decision in the 
"flag-salute case," West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette, 16 in 
which the Court held unconstitutional a 
state-imposed requirement that all chil-
dren attending public schools recite the 
Pledge of Allegiance. The plaintiffs, 
Jehovah's Witnesses, considered the 
Pledge to violate their religious beliefs. 
Writing for the Court, Justice Jackson 
recognized the plaintiff's right not to 
participate in the dissemination of the 
state's prescribed message: "If there is 
any fixed star in our constitutional con-
stellation, it is that no official, high or 
petty, can prescribe what shall be ortho-
dox in politics, nationalism, religion, or 
other matters of opinion or force citizens 
to confess by word or act their faith 
therein. "17 
Wooley v. Maynard18 made it clear 
that the constitutional prohibition 
against forced dissemination of the gov-
ernment's ideological messages applies 
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even where the speaker is not required 
to affirm his or her acceptance of the 
government's views. In Wooley, some 
New Hampshire residents challenged a 
law requiring them to display the state 
motto, "Live Free or Die," on their 
vehicle license plates. Unlike compelled 
recitation of the Pledge of Allegiance, 
display of the state motto on license 
plates does not require affirmation of 
the state's message. The Court found 
this distinction to be irrelevant, holding 
that "[t]he First Amendment protects 
the right of individuals ... to refuse to 
foster, in the way New Hampshire com-
mands, an idea they find morally objec-
tionable. " 19 The Court described the 
essence of the constitutional violation in 
both Barnette and Wooley as the re-
quirement that someone "be an instru-
ment for fostering public adherence to 
an ideological point of view he finds 
unacceptable. ''2° It makes no difference 
that the objectionable ideological point 
of view happens to belong to the gov-
ernment. 
Consequently, the applicability of the 
legal notices exception to the constitu-
tional prohibition against forced dissem-
ination of speech depends on more than 
just the public or private status of the 
person whose message one is compelled 
to disseminate. As explained below, the 
content and, possibly, the purpose of 
that message-that is, whether (I) it con-
tains ideological speech or merely factual, 
uncontroversial information; and (2) the 
message is intended to prevent deceptive 
commercial speech by the person who is 
forced to disseminate that message, or 
promote the interests of that person's 
ideological opponent-determine whether 
or not the message is a permissible legal 
notice. 
Applicability of the Legal Notices 
Exception: The Zauderer Doctrine. The 
leading case regarding the constitution-
ality of compelled dissemination of legal 
·notices is Zauderer v. Office of Disci-
plinary Counse/.2 1 Zauderer arose out 
of an attorney disciplinary proceeding 
regarding alleged violations of various 
Ohio disciplinary rules pertaining to 
attorney advertising, including one rule 
that required lawyer advertisements to 
disclose that clients in contingency fee 
cases could be liable for significant liti-
gation costs even if their lawsuits were 
unsuccessful. In upholding this forced 
disclosure rule, the Court stressed that 
Ohio was simply requiring the lawyer to 
"include in his advertising purely factual 
and uncontroversial information about 
the terms under which his services will 
be available. Because the expansion of 
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First Amendment protection to commer-
cial speech is justified principally by the 
value to consumers of the information 
such speech provides, ... appellant's con-
stitutionally protected interest in not 
providing any particular factual informa-
tion in his advertising is minimal. "22 
The scope of this holding remains 
unclear. Although the PG&E plurality 
held that Zauderer was inapplicable to 
the ideological messages that TURN was 
authorized to distribute, it broadly char-
acterized the Zauderer holding: "The 
State, of course, has substantial leeway 
in determining appropriate information 
disclosure requirements for business cor-
porations. Sec Zauderer v. Office of 
Disciplinar.r Counsel, 471 U.S. 626,651 
(1985). Nothing in Zauderer suggests. 
however. that the State is equally free to 
require corporations to carry the messages 
of third parties, where the messages 
themselves are biased against or are ex-
pressly contrary to the corporation's 
views."23 
After PG&E, the crucial issue regard-
ing the scope of the legal notices excep-
tion is whether, under that doctrine, (a) 
one may be forced to disseminate infor-
mation about one's ideological opponent 
as long as that information is factual 
and uncontroversial, or (b) one may 
only be forced to disseminate factual 
information necessary to avoid the possi-
bility that one's own commercial speech 
could be deceptive. Once again, the ex-
perience with lllinois'CUB Act is illumin-
ating. In Central lffinois Light, the 
Seventh Circuit held that, "[w]hile Zaud-
erer holds that sellers can be forced to 
declare information about themselves 
needed to avoid deception, it does not 
suggest that companies can be made 
into involuntary solicitors for their 
idealogical [sic] opponents. "24 If the 
Seventh Circuit's holding is correct, it 
bodes ill for any attempt-through "legal 
notices," consumer advocacy check-off 
inserts, or otherwise25-to require utili-
ties (or anyone else) to participate in 
efforts to assist their opponents. All 
such efforts involve requiring persons to 
serve as "involuntary solicitors" for 
their opponents. 
However, there is reason to question 
such a narrow interpretation of Zauderer. 
The Court in PG&E could have easily 
rejected TU RN's reliance on Zauderer 
by holding that the legal notices excep-
tion was limited to commercial speech 
and did not apply to disclosures intended 
to assist the utility's opponents. Instead, 
the Court stressed the ideological con-
tent ofTURN's messages, observing that 
"the messages themselves are biased 
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against or are expressly contrary to the 
corporation's views."2~ That language 
would appear to leave open the possibili-
ty that it would have been permissible, 
under Zauderer, to require the utility to 
carry "factual and uncontroversial"27 
inserts from TURN. 
A broader interpretation of Zauderer 
-one that would apply a deferential 
standard of review to forced dissemina-
tion of factual information about the 
disseminator's ideological opponents-
is also consistent with the concern re-
peatedly expressed by the Court in other 
negative free speech cases about the 
compelled dissemination of ideological 
speech. 28 Perhaps due to the CUB Act's 
express limitations on the content of the 
speech in CUB's enclosures, 29 the Sev-
enth Circuit's Central !ffinois Light 
decision does not focus on the nature of 
the speech that the utilities were being 
forced to disseminate. Instead, that de-
cision appears to be implicitly based on 
protecting utilities' "negative freedom of 
association rights"- -that is, their freedom 
not to be "associated" in their billing 
statements with a group that they oppose.Jo 
This reasoning rests on questionable 
constitutional footing. Prior forced asso-
ciation cases have tended to involve some 
form of impact on free speech rights.Ji 
Consequently, unless forced association 
with an opponent's factual and uncontro-
versial messages necessarily infringes 
free speech rights, that form of forced 
association may be permissible.-12 
Testing the Limits of Zauderer: The 
Forced Disclosure Provisions of Propo-
sition 103. The forced disclosure re-
quirements in California's insurance 
reform initiative, Proposition 103, may 
provide an opportunity to determine the 
limits of the Zauderer decision. Propo-
sition 103 adds section 1861. l0(c) to 
California's Insurance Code, which states 
in pertinent part: 
"( c )(I) The [California insur-
ance] commissioner shall require 
every insurer to enclose notices in 
every policy or renewal premium 
bill informing policyholders of the 
opportunity to join an independ-
ent, non-profit corporation which 
shall advocate the interests of 
insurance consumers in any forum. 
This organization shall be estab-
lished by an interim board of pub-
lic members designated by the 
commissioner and operated by 
individuals who are democratically 
elected from its membership .... 
(2) The commissioner shall by 
regulation determine the content 
of the enclosures and other pro-
9 
10 
cedures necessary for implementa-
tion of this provision .... "JJ 
Proposition l03's express limitation 
on the content of the notices to "inform-
ing policyholders of the opportunity to 
join an independent, non-profit corpor-
ation which shall advocate the interests 
of insurance consumers in any forum" 
would appear to ensure that the notices 
will consist solely of "factual and uncon-
troversial information. "34 Moreover, 
unlike the forced disclosure schemes 
invalidated in PG&E and Central 
Illinois Light, Proposition 103 contains 
an additional safeguard against ideologi-
cal messages by providing that the text 
of the messages will be determined in 
the first instance by a presumably neu-
tral government officiaJ.35 Assuming 
that this forced disclosure requirement 
is reasonably related to a legitimate state 
interest, section 1861.10( c) should, there-
fore, be constitutional unless, as the 
Seventh Circuit has concluded, Zauderer 
does not sanction requiring insurance 
companies to "be made into involuntary 
solicitors for their idealogical [sic] 
opponents. "36 
Although several lawsuits have been 
filed against various provisions of Propo-
sition 103, the constitutionality of the 
forced disclosure provision in Insurance 
Code section 1861.lO(c) does not pres-
ently appear to be a focus of those 
challenges. However, if an authoritative 
decision of the constitutionality of that 
provision ever were rendered, it likely 
would determine the validity of any 
forced disclosure provisions, including 
more modest programs such as consumer 
advocacy check-offs.37 In short, Propo-
sition I 03 provides an ideal opportunity 
to determine whether or not Zauderer 
authorizes forcing someone to dissemin-
ate factual and uncontroversial informa-
tion about an ideological opponent. 
An Alternative Solution: 
Distributing Notices Through 
State Mailings 
Following the invalidation of the 
Illinois CUB Act's forced disclosure pro-
vision in the Central Illinois Light liti-
gation, the Illinois General Assembly 
passed a statute intended to provide 
another means of promoting the Illinois 
CUB.38 The new law authorizes CUB to 
submit enclosures in certain mass mail-
ings by state agencies, such as income 
tax refunds and driver's license renewals.39 
By not requiring the utilities to partici-
pate in efforts intended to assist their 
ideological opponent, the Illinois statute 
largely avoids the First Amendment 
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issues inherent in any forced access provision. 
There are, to be sure, some obvious 
limitations to the Illinois approach. First, 
one would expect that including inserts 
about a utility consumers organization 
in, for example, vehicle license plate 
renewals would not be as effective in 
promoting that organization as including 
such inserts in utility bills. Nevertheless, 
the new Illinois law has proven success-
ful. With the assistance of inserts in 
state mailings, the Illinois CUB has been 
averaging more than 4,000 new members 
per month and has reached a total mem-
bership of more than 100,000.40 CUB is 
receiving approximately the same re-
sponse rate that it did to its previous 
enclosures in utility billing statements.41 
Second, there are practical limits to 
the number of different consumer organi-
zations-even state-created organizations-
that can be promoted in state mailings. 
The approach taken by Proposition I 03, 
on the other hand, has the advantage of 
being adaptable to establish and promote 
state-created consumer organizations in 
a virtually unlimited number of areas, 
leaving open the possibility that similar 
groups and similar compelled disclosure 
provisions could be created in areas of 
interest to consumers such as health 
care, product liability, and financial 
counseling, among others. 
On balance, I believe that, at least 
until the constitutionality of the kind of 
forced disclosure scheme contained in 
Proposition 103 is clearly established, 
the stronger constitutional basis for the 
state-mailing concept employed in Illin-
ois outweighs the potential advantages 
of any forced-disclosure scheme. The 
Illinois model warrants serious consider-
ation by those seeking to strengthen the 
voice of consumers in public utility mat-
ters and other important consumer issues. 
Conclusion 
Illinois' experience with its Citizens 
Utility Board reveals that, rather than 
turning on the public or private status 
of the consumer group whose message is 
disseminated, the constitutionality of 
forced-access schemes to promote con-
sumer organizations is likely to turn on 
the authorized content of the messages 
and whether or not the legal notices 
exception extends to disclosures intended 
to assist the ideological opponents of 
the disclosing parties. The Illinois experi-
ence is also noteworthy for its successful 
pioneering of a means of promoting its 
CUB that largely avoids the potential 
constitutional problems inherent in forced 
disclosure schemes. 
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